CHAPTER 1

AESOP AND ANIMAL FABLE
JEREMY B. LEFKOWITZ

Introduction
It is a commonplace to assert that the anthropomorphic animals of fable have noth
ing in common with real animals. Famous stories such as ‘The Tortoise and the Hare’
(Perry 226), ‘The Fox and the Grapes’ (Perry 15), and ‘The Ant and the Cricket’ (Perry
373). epitomize the fable’s tendency to project human instincts and responses onto ani
mal protagonists with little concern for naturalism or genuine animal behaviour. But, in
granting speech to animals, fables not only endow animals with the quintessential fac
ulty of the human mind, they also draw attention to questions about what differentiates
human from animal by manipulating a standard marker of the boundary between the
two categories. Moreover, our notions of what the ancient fable is and does have under
gone radical revision over the past several decades, making it increasingly difficult to
characterize the genre’s attitude towards animals in simple terms. After offering brief
overviews of sources and scholarly approaches to the Graeco-Latin fable, this chapter
will attempt to identify tensions in fable between the symbolic valence of anthropomor
phic animals and authentic concerns about real animals. By drawing attention to some
of the ways in which the fable engaged in dialogue with the literary and cultural contexts
from which it emerged, this chapter aims to lay open numerous pathways for explora
tion of the fable’s interaction with contemporaneous conceptions of and anxieties about
animals in the Classical world.

Aesop’s Fables: Sources
AND Approaches
It is tempting to take the animal fable as a starting point for an investigation of Greek
and Roman ideas about animals. After all, despite the exclusively textual nature of our
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evidence for the ancient fable, it is generally assumed that written fables bear traces of
an oral tradition that stretches back to the very dawn of history. Before the occurrence
of the earliest Greek animal fables in the poems of Hesiod {Works and Days 202-12)
and Archilochus (frs. 172-81 West), and long before the earliest reference to the legend
ary fabulist Aesop in the fifth century BC (Herodotus, Histories 2.134), the genre had
already enjoyed a long history in the Near East, from where, most scholars agree, the
fable migrated to Greece during the orientalizing revolution of the archaic period
(Burkert, 1992; cf Meuli, 1954; Nojgaard, 1964: i.431-41; Perry, 1965; xi-xxxiv; Karadagli,
1981: 6-52; West, 1997; 319). The Greeks themselves considered the fable to be of great
antiquity, and in a number of instances Greek authors associate the fable with various
exotic figures (e.g., Conis the Cilician, Thouros the Sybarite, and Cybissus the Libyan)
and locales (e.g., Libya, Phrygia, Cilicia, Caria, Egypt) that had reputations as sources of
wisdom in the Greek imagination.
But there are good reasons to be cautious when calibrating the antiquity of any Greek
or Latin fable or when reflecting generally on the purity and primordiality of the wis
dom the tradition espouses. For one, all of the extant fables to which we have access
are found either in highly developed and sophisticated literary contexts (e.g., in the
works of authors such as Aristophanes, Aristotle, Callimachus, Horace, Phaedrus, and
Babrius) or in late prose collections (our oldest substantial prose collection, the Collectio
Augustana, probably dates from the second or third century AD), in which the narrative
style and linguistic register suggest a deliberate and cultivated air of simplicity (Perry,
1962:343). The rhetorician Nicolaus recommends an approach to fable composition that
aptly describes what we encounter in the extant prose collections that form the basis of
what we have come to know as Aesop’s fables’:
The language (phrasis) should be very simple, straightforward, unassuming, and free
of all subtlety and periodic expression, so that the meaning is absolutely clear and the
words do not appear to be loftier in stature than the actors, especially when these are
animals.
(Nicolaus, Progymnasmata 2.11)
The simple style of the fable—one of its trademarks—is often a studied ruse, designed
to strip away evidence of artistry in order to give the prosaic narratives an air of archa
ism and authenticity (cf. Quintilian, Institutiones Oratoriae 1.9.2-3). When one consid
ers that the earliest prose collection we know of is the lost ‘collection of Aesopic fables’
{Aisopeion logon sunagoge, Diogenes Laertius, Lives 5.80) compiled by Demetrius of
Phaleron in the fourth century BC, and when one acknowledges the enormous gulf
that lies between a collection such as the Collectio Augustana and the sixth century BC,
when Aesop was supposed to have flourished as a logopoios (‘fable-maker’) (Herodotus,
Histories 2.134), it becomes clear that anyone wishing to develop an informed sense of
the antiquity or style of Aesopic fables will first need to come to terms with the diverse
goals and motivations of the various authors who wrote them down.
For Greek and Roman authors, the genre ‘fable’ and its legendary founder ‘Aesop are
not mutually distinct categories. Aesop left no writing and no single fable can be securely
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ascribed to him, but he was so prominent as a fable-teller that stories, anecdotes, prov
erbs, and other types of narrative became associated with his name because they conform
to certain loosely defined stylistic prerequisites. Thus the tradition appropriates massive
amounts of material under the name ‘Aesop’ with little or no concern for historicity. It is
telling that even the earliest authors to associate particular fables with Aesop in the fifth
and fourth centuries already use the adjective Aesopikos (Aristophanes, Wasps 1259) or
refer to stories in the style of Aesop (Plato, Phaedo 60b; cf. Phaedrus 3.29).

Sources
Our sources for the Greek and Latin fable fall into four categories of evidence:
(1) Fables are told, either in whole or in part, in diverse genres of Greek and Latin liter
ature, prose and verse, in periods ranging from Archaic Greece to Late Antiquity. Some
of the most famous examples are: Hesiod (Works and Days 202-12), Archilochus (fr. 17281 West), Aeschylus {Myrmidons fr. 139 Radt), Herodotus {Histories 1.141). Aristophanes
{Wasps 1401-5; 1427-32; 1435-40; Birds 471-5), Plato {Phaedo 6ob-c; Phaedrus 259
b-c), Aristotle {Rhetoric i393bio-22; I393b22-i394ai), Ennius {Satires fr. 21-58 Vahlen),
Horace {Satires 6.79-117), and Livy (2.32.5-12). Beginning in the fifth century BC, fables
embedded in other genres are occasionally ascribed to Aesop with varying degrees of
specificity; sometimes a fable is ascribed to Aesop with reference to a particular moment
in the fabulist’s life when he may have told such a fable (e.g., Aristophanes, Wasps i44if-)>
while in other instances there is only vague reference to a story told in the manner of
Aesop (Plato, Phaedo 60c) (West, 1984). Rarely does an author simply address a fable to
the reader or audience directly. Usually a scene of fable-telling is represented, in which
a character (or the narrator/poetic persona, e.g., in Hesiod and Horace) is imagined to
be telling a fable to a specific addressee(s) in a particular situation for a specified reason.
(2) Fables are preserved in Greek and Latin fable collections, in prose and verse,
beginning with the lost collection of Demetrius of Phalerum (c.350-280 BC), which
Diogenes Laertius described as a ‘collection of Aesopic stories’ {Aisopeion logon
sunagoge, Diogenes Laertius, Lives 5.80), in the earliest notice of such a collection.
Fragments of a fable collection in Greek prose are preserved in Rylands Papyrus 493
(first century AD; cf Roberts 1938, III, ii9f), which may be a fragment of Demetrius’s
collection (Perry, 1965: xiv). Of our surviving prose collections, it is generally agreed
that the Collectio Augustana (231 fables, known also as Recension I) is the ancestor of the
collections known as Recension la (143 fables), the Collectio Vindobonensis (130 fables.
Recension II), and the Collectio Accursiana (127 fables. Recension III). There are also a
number of brief collections linked to rhetorical instruction, including a bilingual (Greek
and Latin) collection ascribed to pseudo-Dositheus (second century AD) and the Greek
prose collection of Aphthonius (fourth century AD). The verse fable books by Phaedrus
(first century AD), Babrius (early third century AD), and Avianus (late fourth/early
fifth century AD) have been most influential on the subsequent tradition and have
spawned prose paraphrases as well (e.g., the so-called Bodleian paraphrase of Babrius
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and Romulus’s Aesopus Latinus, which draws heavily, if not exclusively, on Phaedrian
material). Generally, while the authors of prose collections tend to remain anonymous
(or blatantly pseudonymous, as in the case of ‘Romulus’) and self-effacing, the authors
of verse collections are not only named but they even engage in sophisticated reflections
on authorship and, in the case of Phaedrus, literary history. The relationships between
the various major and minor collections and the fate of the medieval manuscripts that
form the basis of our modern texts are complex problems, made in every instance more
difficult by the open, adaptable, and appropriative spirit of the fable tradition.
(3) The anonymous Life of Aesop, which was probably at one point in its history an
introductory text attached to a collection such as that of Demetrius, is a source of several
fables embedded in its narrative; but it is of primary importance for the picture it pro
vides of the legendary founder of the genre. This fictionalized biography is usually dated
to the second century AD, though various elements of its narrative were known in one
form or another as early as the fifth century BC (Perry, 1936; 1-26; Nagy, 1979: 280-90,
300-316; West, 1984; Holzberg, 2002; Kurke, 2003; cf Adrados, 1999:271-85, who argues
for an earlier date). There seem to have been rival traditions in antiquity on the matters
of Aesop’s origins and life as a fabulist. On the one hand, the historical record places
him firmly on Samos in the sixth century BC (Herodotus, Histories 2.134; Aristotle,
Constitution of the Samians [fr. 573 Rose]), where he gained notoriety as a fable-teller
{logopoios), and may even have defended a politician on trial for embezzlement
(Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.20). On the other hand, beginning in the fifth century BC, there
is a more legendary tradition that has Aesop associated with major sites and figures of
his day, including not only Aesop’s infamous execution at the hands of the Delphians
(Herodotus, Histories 2.134; Aristophanes, Wasps 1443-8) and subsequent return to life
(Plato Comicus, fr. 70 KA), but also affiliations with Solon (Alexis, fr. 9 KA), Periander
(Plutarch, Banquet of the Seven Sages), and Croesus (Plutarch, Life of Solon 28). The Life
of Aesop, which is usually dated to the first or second century AD (Kurke, 2010: 5-6),
draws primarily upon this latter body of Aesopic lore, as well as borrowing motifs and
episodes from the Aramaic Story ofAhikar (cf Life ofAesop, chs. 101-23), and numerous
other sources (cf Wiechers, 1961; La Penna, 1962; Jedrkiewicz, 1989), to create a novel
account of the fabulist’s life. The text history is troubled, although Perry’s edition of Vita
G has become something of a standard, as it is thought to be the oldest and fullest extant
version (Perry, 1952; cf Papathomopoulos, 1991; Ferrari, 1997).
(4) Allusions and intertexts. Despite persistent, romantic notions that fables bear
direct traces of man’s earliest observations of the animal world, or that they enshrine the
world view of a period in which man lived closer to nature, most scholars in recent years
have downplayed fable’s putative temporal priority and emphasized instead the fable’s
interconnectedness with other related traditions and literary genres (cf Dijk, 1997;
Adrados, 1999; Kurke, 2010). The heterogeneous category of‘fable’ shares many features
with related types of figurative and indirect speech acts in which animals often appear,
including riddle, portent, simile, metaphor, allegory, and especially proverb. Allusions
to fables tend to appear in genres in which animals already figure prominently, includ
ing such diverse traditions as Attic comedy, natural history, and mock epic. But traces of
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fable motifs may be found in any number of media. Influence can be expected to be (to
some degree) reciprocal in allusions to fables, with an individual fable functioning as the
seed of this or that image in some instances and in turn bearing the traces of its deploy
ment in a particular context in others.

Approaches to Animal Fable
The animal fable occupies a privileged position in the history of the genre; animals play
a role in roughly 75% of fables in the Collectio Augustana, 65% of Phaedrus, and 80% of
Babrius. But in every period of the fable’s history one also encounters numerous and
diverse narratives considered to be ‘fables’ that make no mention of animals, includ
ing stories featuring plants, gods, personifications (e.g., Religio, Phaedrus 4.11; Tempus,
Phaedrus 5.8; Alethie, Babrius 126), and humans, both generic and pseudo-historical (cf.
Phaedrian fables featuring Socrates, Simonides, and Pompey). A misleading ancient
opinion with a good deal of currency had it that ‘Aesopic’ fables are defined by their
use of animal characters, while fables that feature humans are called either ‘Sybaritic’ or
‘Libyan’; but the original source of this opinion, a scholiast’s comment at Aristophanes
Wasps 1259, seems to draw the distinction only from lines of that play (the source of the
only two ‘Sybaritic’ fables known to us), which in fact does not reflect so neat a division
(Dijk, 1997:108). Despite the undeniable popularity of talking animals in the tradition,
the adjective ‘Aesopic’, from its earliest description of a story in Aristophanic comedy
until the present day, is used to refer to a manner of telling stories rather than to any par
ticular type of content.
A story or anecdote may come to be recognized as a ‘fable’ for any number of rea
sons, among which the most prominent are; (1) it is explicitly referred to as an ainos,
muthos, or logos, in Greek, or apologus,fabula, orfabella, in Latin (cf. Dijk, 1997:79-111);
(2) it is ascribed to Aesop (cf West, 1984) or collected under Aesop’s name (Perry, 1952);
(3) it contains certain formulae and/or conventional narrative elements that are strongly
associated with the tradition, such as, for example, specific introductory and closing for
mulae (Fraenkel, 1920; Karadagli, 1981), a tripartite narrative structure (Nojgaard, 1964),
and/or an explicit announcement of the story’s message or ‘moral’ (Perry, 1940). The
latter is frequently posited as the defining characteristic of the fable, but in fact many
other indirect modes of communication may occasionally involve the drawing out of a
moralizing message, including forms technically distinct from fable, such as the chreia
and the historical exemplum.
Traditionally, studies of the Graeco-Latin fable have been characterized by a range of
structuralist and definitional projects. The predominant concerns of twentieth-century
fable scholarship were: studies of the formal features and content of the fable influenced
by the work of Andre Jolles and Vladimir Propp (see especially Nojgaard, 1964); folkloric investigations into the origins of the motifs, characters, and the geographic sources
of the fable (see especially Halliday, 1927; Meuli, 1954; Josifovic, 1974); and traditional
Quellenforschung (e.g., Chambry, 1925-6; Hausrath, 1940-56). While the seemingly
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intractable problems of defining the genre and identifying the boundaries between fable
and various other forms (proverb, exemplutn, parable, chreia, etc.) continue to occupy
scholars, over the past several decades a major shift in perspective has developed, which
is reflected in the growing number of studies by classicists on the ancient fable and the
figure of Aesop. Whereas most modern approaches to fable have been marked by an
interest in various kinds of structures and origins, recent studies show an overriding
interest in contextualizing the Aesopic fable in one way or another. In addition to major
overviews such as Dijk’s Ainoi, Muthoi, Logoi: Fables in Archaic, Classical, and Hellenistic
Greek Literature (1997), the massive three-volume History of the Graeco-Latin Fable
by Adrados (1999), Holzberg’s The Ancient Fable: An Introduction (2002), and Kurkes

Aesopic Conversations: Popular Tradition, Cultural Dialogue, and the Invention of Greek
Prose (2010), several other recent books and articles have attempted in various ways
to situate Aesop and the fable within the broader contexts of Greek and Roman liter
ary, social, or cultural histories (e.g., Nagy, 1979. i99i; Winkler, 1985; Jedrkiewicz, 1989;
Holzberg, 1992; Hopkins, 1993; Bloomer, 1997; Henderson, 2001; Kurke, 2003). There
have also been a few related and noteworthy efforts to position the Greek fable within
the broader context of interactions between Archaic Greece and the traditions of the
Near East (especially Burkert (1992:120-4) and West (1997:495))This is not to say that any clear scholarly consensus has emerged on the history of the
fable, nor that contemporary scholars have lost interest in issues relating to source and
textual history. But there has been an undeniable movement away from asking historical
questions for their own sake towards the formulation of historicizing questions—rather
than seeking to reconstruct the real fable as it originally existed or seeking to describe
the essential features of the fable, recent studies are united by an interest in studying the
presence of fables in specific contexts and in tracing the evolution of the Aesopic tradi
tion within broader historical and literary developments.

A ‘Monstrous and Chaotic’ Literary Genre
In their movement away from structuralist, formalist, and folkloristic approaches,
towards more context-specific perspectives, these recent studies reach back (explic
itly, in some cases) to the work of Ben Edwin Perry. In his monumental Aesopica
(1952)—a text that, more than any other single criterion, has come to define what
counts as Aesopic’—and in a number of influential mid-century publications (Perry
1940, 1962, 1965), Perry insisted that the fable was better understood as a kind of
rhetorical device than a literary genre, and he emphasized the fundamental impor
tance of acknowledging the fable’s links to its diverse literary contexts. Perry resisted
reductionist efforts to define the fable; for Perry, there is simply no such thing as a
real Aesopic fable: ‘Fable is as fable does’ (Perry, 1959: 66). Instead, there is the vast
and eclectic sum-total of whatever diverse, chronologically distinct authors decided
for themselves constituted ‘Aesopica. As he wrote in the preface to his Aesopica
(Preface, x):
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The range of what may rightly be called Aesopic, both by tradition and by kind, is so
vast and so repetitious as not to be worth including, even if it were possible, within the
compass of a single, necessarily monstrous and chaotic volume. A fable invented by an
eighteenth-century writer, or by one today, may be just as truly Aesopic’ in all essential
respects as any of those which were made up or adapted from popular lore in antiquity
after the time of Aesop, which is to say any of the fables extant in ancient collections.
Although ancient and modern observers have frequently become interested in the
origins, definitions, and boundaries of the fable, in practice, as Perry emphasized, the
Aesopic fable is an appropriative, adaptable, flexible, ‘monstrous and chaotic’ literary
category. As Perry’s hook demonstrates, the Aesopic fahle is less an independent literary
genre than an accumulation of material deployed in other genres.

Nothing to Do with the Zoo?
Despite recent efforts to situate the Aesopic fable in Greek and Roman literary and cul
tural histories, scholarship on the fahle remains somewhat indifferent to animals. While
it continues to be taken for granted that fahles have nothing to teach us about real ani
mals, the emphases in recent scholarship on the genre’s diversity and its dialogue with
other forms of cultural expression can he taken as starting points for a re-evaluation of
the conventional view that fable has nothing to do with animals qua animals. We may
now ask a number of questions. Does the anthropomorphism of fables preclude the pos
sibility that they may shed light on ancient views of the animal world? To what extent
was Aesopic fable in dialogue with mainstream currents in Greek and Roman thinking
about animals? How will acknowledgement of the eclecticism and diversity of the cat
egory of‘Aesopica’ influence our assessment of the fable’s interest in zoology? Instead of
attempting encyclopedic coverage of these problems, in what follows I offer a series of
snapshots of moments where tensions arise between the fable’s commitment to anthro
pomorphism and its rootedness in a wider discourse about the boundaries between
humans and the rest of the animal world.

Boundaries Between Human and
Animal in Early Greek Fable-Telling
Let us begin by turning directly to Hesiod’s fable of the hawk and nightingale, the earli
est animal fable in Greek literature;
And here’s a fable for kings, who’ll not need it explained:
It’s what the hawk said high in the clouds
As he carried off a speckle-throated nightingale
Skewered on his talons. She complained something pitiful.
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And he made this high and mighty speech to her:
‘No sense in your crying. You’re in the grip of real strength now,
And you’ll go where I take you, songbird or not.
I’ll make a meal of you if I want, or I might let you go.
Only a fool struggles against his superiors.
He not only gets beat, but humiliated as well.’
Thus spoke the hawk, the windlord, his long wings beating.
But you, Perses, you listen to Justice
And don’t cultivate Violence.
(Hesiod, Works and Days 202-13, tr. Lombardo)
The deceptive simplicity of Hesiod’s fable obscures a number of interpretive prob
lems. For one, it is not clear whether Hesiod is directing the message of the fable to the
kings ‘who’ll not need it explained’ (phroneousi kai autois), to whom the fable is initially
addressed (202), or if it is aimed at his brother, Perses, who is named at line 213 and who
is the primary addressee in the rest of the poem. Second, it is not at all obvious that
there is a message to this particular fable: if Hesiod proceeds to advise Perses to listen
to Justice’ (sM d’ akoue Dikes) and not to ‘cultivate Violence’ {med’ hubrin ophelle), then
why is the hawk—and its profoundly harsh and unjust world view given the last word
at lines 207-11? Third, if we presume that the fable is a kind of allegory corresponding to
the immediate context (i.e., the situation in which the narrator/Hesiod, Perses, and the
kings find themselves), then how does the symbolism operate? Is it the case, as suggested
in the scholia, that Hesiod = nightingale {aoidos = aedon) and the kings = hawk? Or is it
perhaps nightingale = Perses (Hubbard, 1995) or hawk = Zeus (Nelson, 1997)? Finally,
given the absence of a number of conventional features normally associated with fable,
including especially a setting of the stage (Daly, 1961a), and given the focus of the narra
tive on ‘what the hawk said’ (203), which makes the whole thing seem more like a chreia
(a pithy and ‘useful’ anecdote referring to what someone once did or said on a specific
occasion), is it even correct to call this passage a ‘fable’?
It is worth noting that this last problem dissipates if, following the lead of our ancient
sources, we embrace the appropriative nature of the ancient fable tradition. Indeed,
Hesiod’s fable was frequently held to be exemplary of the genre in ancient testimonies
and Hesiod was mentioned as a pre-Aesopic fabulist in a number of ancient texts (cf.
Dijk, 1997:127). Although no ‘Hawk and Nightingale fables have been identified in Near
Eastern sources—despite extensive evidence of Near Eastern influence in the rest of the
Hesiodic corpus (West, 1997)—at least two versions, no doubt influenced by Hesiod,
appear in later Greek and Latin prose compilations under the name of‘Aesop (Perry 4
and 567). Moreover, Hesiod seems to go out of his way to label this story a ‘fable (202).
Hesiod’s word for ‘fable’ here is ainos, a term that remained attached to animal fable
throughout antiquity (cf. Quintilian, Institutiones Oratoriae 5.11.19-21 and Aelius Theon,
Progymnasmata 3), but that is in fact found in only a small number of literary fables
(e.g., Hesiod, Works and Days 202, Archililochus fr. 174 W and fr. 185 West; Callimachus
fr. 194 Pfeiffer). Nonetheless, the term’s significance for the history of the genre can
not be overstated (Fraenkel, 1920). It is particularly useful to consider the term ainos
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within the context of a network of other related words including the verb ainittesthai (‘to
hint at’, ‘to say allegorically’) (Nagy, 1979; cf Rosen, 1984). Thus aims terms were also
used to designate ‘proverb’ (e.g., Callimachus fr. 178.9 Pfeiffer)—because of the oblique
way in which proverbial phrases refer to the contexts in which they are deployed—as
well as a number of other types of symbolic or metaphorical speech acts, including
‘riddle’ {ainigma < ainittesthai) (cf. Struck, 2004). The function of fables, in turn, was
occasionally described by forms of the verb ainittesthai (cf Sophocles, Ajax 1158 and
Aristophanes, Peace 46) and, according to Theon (first century AD), a fable could be
called an ainigma: ‘Nowadays some people even refer to fables as ainigmata’ {nun mentoi kai ta ainigmata ainous tines kalousi; Theon, Progymnasmata 3). In this context, we
are inclined to see the translation of ainos as ‘fable’ in Hesiod as valid but perhaps insuf
ficient. Packed into the sense of ainos are (1) the presence of multiple levels of mean
ing and (2) a discernible ulterior motive on the part of the speaker (cf Homer, Odyssey
14.508; Archilochus fr. 174 West; Callimachus fr. 194.6 Pfeiffer).
But the presence of multiple audiences (the kings and Perses) in lines 202-13 and
the packing of multiple levels of meaning into the ainos make the function of animal
imagery and symbolism extremely difficult for us to decode, especially if we expect a
neat correspondence between animal protagonists and the ‘real’ human characters
of the Works and Days. Is Hesiod simultaneously attempting to persuade the kings to
give ‘sound’ judgments and trying to convince Perses that he is doomed if he continues
socializing with the kings? Perhaps. Or it is the case that Hesiod, as nightingale, must
give up seeking to change the behaviour of the kings, as hawk, and turn his attention
instead to saving Perses? That scholars should have found a number of persuasive and
incompatible ways of working out the identifications of the two birds is itself evidence
that we may be dealing with an intractable problem. If we are open to viewing animal
fables as engaged with larger currents in ancient discourse on animals in general, then
we can bracket the symbolic correspondences as just one (perhaps irresolvable) dimen
sion of Hesiod’s ainos. Indeed, the most persuasive readings of Hesiod’s ainos (cf Daly,
1961a; West, 1978; Heath, 1985; Lamberton, 1988) have abandoned any neat solution to
the problems posed by its symbolic function and have drawn attention instead to a pas
sage that appears some 60 lines later:
Perses, you take all this to heart. Listen
To what’s right, and forget about violence.
The son of Kronos has laid down the law for humans.
Fish and beasts and birds of prey feed on
Each other, since there’s no justice among them.
But to men he gave justice, and that works out
All to the good.
(Hesiod, Works and Days 274-80, tr. Lombardo)
The gap between this passage and the fable is, admittedly, a cause for concern; but the
passages that intervene fall into two, roughly equal sections (213-47, addressed to Perses,
and 248-73, addressed to the kings), in which Hesiod remains doggedly focused on the
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dangers of violence {hubris) and the urgent need for justice {dike). The implications of
this passage on any interpretation of the earlier ainos and the hawk’s triumphant cel
ebration of the principle of‘might is right’ are undeniable. The hawk’s apparent amoral
application is reversed by the distinction that is subsequently drawn between the bestial
and the human order (Heath, 1985: 249). Zeus has required that humans conduct their
relationships by dike, not—like animals—by bie. Thus it is possible to read this passage
as a retrospective rejection of the earlier animal fable tout court, and a recasting of the
talking, anthropomorphic animals as, simply, animals.
In a way, Hesiod is implying that fable-telling is a waste of time. Or, put another way,
by using talking animals merely to show that real animals behave in ways that are not
appropriate for humans, Hesiod undercuts the central conceit of animal fable. But there
are two further points that draw attention to the potential for viewing Hesiod’s ainos as
a model for the ways in which animal fables may engage with wider discourses about
animals in the Greek world. Firstly, the basis for Hesiod’s rejection of animal fable is
the denial of justice to animals, which remains a central tenet of conceptions of the
differences between humans and animals throughout antiquity. For example, Plato’s
Protagoras (32oc-322d) has the sophist Protagoras tell a story about how Zeus gave jus
tice to men to save them from one another—Protagoras’s myth emphasizes that the gift
was not granted to animals, since the need for justice only arose once men had decided
to live in close quarters with each other in cities—for the very reason of excluding ani
mals (Sorabji, r993:117). Urbanization, on the one hand, protects humans from wild ani
mals; justice, on the other, protects humans from each other. According to this model,
any violation of justice can potentially be cast as a disavowal of one’s essential human
ity—and a downward sliding towards animal behaviour.
The second point is this: Hesiod’s recasting of anthropomorphic animal speech
as futile is in fact paralleled in the action of the hawk towards the nightingale. On the
one hand, the fable presents a kind of animal speech—the nightingale’s song—which is
anthropomorphic (she sings, like a poet) but completely ignored by the hawk; then there
is the hawk’s retort, which is utterly clear and audible, and which itself redescribes the
nightingale’s words as mere ‘screeching’ {lelekas). Thus we can observe that the idea of
animal speech was already problematized in the fable, where the nightingale attempted
to communicate in human terms, but the hawk did not listen—her anthropomorphic
utterances are thrown back at her as irrelevant animal noises in the fable itself. Thus the
central conceit of the animal fable—namely, that there was indeed a time when animals
could speak as men do—is already challenged before Hesiod’s explicit articulation of
the same idea. Speech, of course, is inextricably bound up with Greek ideas about the
differences between human and animal. Aristotle famously denied that animals have
the power of speech {logos) (Aristotle, Politics 1.2,1253a9-i8), although he allowed that
some animals do make meaningful sounds (e.g., phone, semantikos psophos, semainein)
(Aristotle, De Animalibus 2.8, 42ob9-42ia6; Politics 1.2, i253aio-r4). Aristotles insist
ence that animals do not have words {onomata) was grounded in the belief that words
involve a convention {suntheke) (Aristotle, De Interpretatione 2, i6a26-9) (cf. Sorabji,
1993: 81). Thus, as in the denial of justice to animals, Hesiod’s denial of meaningful
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speech to animals anticipates philosophical inquiries about what it means to be human,
what differentiates words from sounds, and where exactly the boundaries between ani
mal and human lie.

Animals

in

Fable Books

Using a fable as an exemplum in a larger context always involved applying the traditional
narrative to a specific setting. Thus Hesiod addresses the fable of the hawk and the night
ingale to the kings and to Perses, as Archilochus addresses the fable of the fox and the
monkey to ‘Kerkydes’ (frs. 185-7 West) and the fable of the fox and the eagle to ‘Father
Lycambes’ (frs. 172-4 West). This is also true of all of the fables told in the Life ofAesop,
in which Aesop is represented as reacting to particular situations, never as simply tell
ing fables for their own sake. When fables are used as exempla, the fable-teller always, to
some degree, implicates his addressee(s) in the traditional narrative; the message to be
drawn from the fable is thus often preceded by a formulaic expression such as ‘You, too,
ought to listen.(su d’ akoue; Works and Days 212) or ‘Thus, you, too... ’ {houtd de kai
su...; Aristophanes, Wasps 1432). In later collections of fables, these formulaic expres
sions evolved into the introductions to promythia and epimythia (ho logos ddoi, ‘The
Fable shows.pros tois, ‘For the type of people who...’) (cf. Perry, 1940). Thus col
lected fables are told without any context whatsoever. If we are to search for traces of ten
sions between the anthropomorphic animals of fable and anxieties about real animals,
then these must be found in the fables themselves. In this section, I argue that, rather
than simply symbolizing this or that human behaviour, animal fables also draw atten
tion to the animal part of the functional analogism of fable, which signifies that the ani
mals have been only partially analogized to human beings, behaving in some ways like
humans but retaining the outward appearance and eating habits of animals (cf Hansen,
1998: 260). On the one hand, in granting animals the power of speech, fables become
fantastic, obvious fictions; on the other hand, by drawing attention to the limits of ani
mal speech and emphasizing the ways in which animals tend to devour one another
from time to time, fables also depend on implicit assumptions about how real animals
behave in the real world.

Futility of Animal Speech
We begin with two wolf fables that appear near each other in the Augustana collection,
which was organized alphabetically according to the name of the primary character
(thus lykos kai aren is numbered 155 in Perry and lykos kai probaton is Perry 159). In the
first (Perry 155), a wolf attempts to find a compelling reason {met’ eulogou aitias) to eat
a lamb he has encountered while drinking in a river. He accuses the lamb of muddying
the water and preventing him from getting a drink, to which the lamb replies that he was
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merely touching the water with his lips and that, since he is downstream from the wolf,
he cannot possibly be disturbing his water. The wolf, failing in this attempt at reasoning
{apotuchon tautes tes aitias), claims that the lamb insulted the wolf s own father lastyear,
before the fable concludes as follows;
When the lamb replied that he was not even one year old, the wolf said to him, ‘Even
if you are so full of good excuses, does that mean I should not devour you?
This fable dramatizes talking animals failing to communicate with one another. Our
attention is drawn to the wolf’s search for a just cause to devour the lamb and to the
lamb’s readiness to defend itself with words; but the only message one can draw from the
fable is that words and just causes are irrelevant. Thus the epimythium reads: ‘The fable
shows that even just arguments {dikaia apologia) have no power {oude... ischuei) over
those who are set on doing wrong.’
Perry 159 also stages a wolf encountering a sheep, but this time the wolf is described
as ‘having eaten his full’ {trophes kekoresmenos) at the time of the meeting. The wolf tells
the sheep that he will let him go if he can make three truthful statements {treis logons
aletheis), which the sheep accomplishes swiftly: he wishes he never met a wolf; he wishes
the wolf he did meet was blind; and he wishes all wolves would die for their unjust and
relentless war against the sheep. The wolf, we are told, accepted the truthfulness of these
statements and let the sheep go. The author of the Augustana attaches an epimythiutn
that expresses the opposite view of the earlier one: ‘The fable shows that the truth
(aletheia) often has force {ischuei) even with enemies.’
Each of these fables presents us with a familiar bogeyman (‘might is right) and famil
iar stereotypes: the wolf is the ultimate predator, violent and insatiable, while the lamb is
the very model of innocence, as well as a keen and clear-eyed truth-teller (cf. Maximus
of Tyre, Orations 19). But neither the character of these animals nor the ethical perspec
tive of the Aesopic tradition can explain the blatant contradiction between these two
fables. The authoritative tone of the epimythia appeals to custom and putatively shared
experience, but clearly the Augustana offers no stable conception of the strength of
truth or justice in the face of hostility (cf. Zafiropoulos, 2001). The only real difference
between the two fables is the change in the wolf’s appetite: when his primary motiva
tion as a predator has been removed {trophes kekoresmenos), the wolf is able to hear the
sheep’s words. This suggests that animal speech is effective only when animal instincts
have been taken out of the equation.
In a similar fable, ‘The Cat and the Rooster’ (Perry 16), a cat ruthlessly devours a bird
after first attempting and failing to justify his behaviour:
A cat had caught a rooster and was looking for a plausible reason for eating him.
First he accused the rooster of being a nuisance to men, because he crowed at night
{nuktor kekragota) and wouldn’t let them sleep. The rooster said that he did this for
their own good, for he was arousing them to go about their accustomed tasks. Again
the cat said, ‘But you are also a confirmed transgressor against nature {asebes eis ten
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physin) in mating with your sisters and your mother.’ When the rooster also said that
he did this for the good of his masters since got the hens to lay many eggs for them,
the cat was nonplussed (diaporetheis) and said, ‘Am I to forgo eating you just because
you always have some plausible excuse?’
We encounter again the paradoxical situation in which animals are miraculously
able to speak but nonetheless unable to converse with one another. After both the cat
and the rooster fail to persuade one another with words, the cat explicitly rejects the
rooster’s powers of speech as futile. Moreover, it is worth noting that the cat’s partic
ular complaints have to do with the rooster’s behaviour as a rooster! That is, it is the
rooster’s animal voice (nuktor kekragota) and mating habits that the cat attempts to use
as a justification for killing him, not some pre-packaged ‘type’ of behaviour the rooster
represents.
The futility of animal speech and the related tension between symbolic and real ani
mals also surfaces in fables in which humans and animals interact with one another
directly. In Perry ii (cf. Herodotus, Histories 1.141), for example, a fisherman tries play
ing the flute in order to get fish to jump spontaneously out of the water. When the fish
do not comply, the fisherman uses his net instead; after the fish are dumped onto the
shore and begin their frantic wriggling, the fisherman rebukes them for not danc
ing {ouk orcheisthe) while he played his music (euloun). Similar is Perry 233 (rec. la),
in which a man purchases a swan—described as a most melodious creature (eumelestaton... zdon)—in order to hear it sing (adein), but is disappointed to discover that it
finally sings only when it sings its own dirge (threnountos heauton) before it is about to
die. In both fables, humans are disappointed by their failure to elicit desired non-verbal,
human-like communication (music, dance, mournful song) from animals, and in both
fables the animals end up dead. Stories like these highlight instead the difficulties of
human-animal intercourse, drawing attention to the folly of anthropomorphizing and
the potentially disastrous results of confusing animal and human behaviour.
The give and take between the fantastic and the real depiction of animals gives rise to a
tension that is more or less discernible in all animal fables. In a most influential study of
the ancient fable, Morten Nojgaard (1964) has described the fable’s management of this
tension as I’allegorie mecanique (‘mechanical allegory’). According to Nojgaard, fables
endow characters with some impossible quality (a talking animal, a visible god, the per
sonification of some belief, etc.), which is only the functional expression of the fact that
the characters are to be taken allegorically; by bringing to the fore the fictitious nature
of the story, the fable establishes that the only possibility of giving it meaning remains
the interpretation (Nojgaard, 1964:1.63). But the fantastic element must be balanced by
an internally logical narrative and by an overall plausibility in order that the fable-teller
may persuade the addressee that the situation of the fable is somehow analogous to the
one in which they find themselves. Thus, following Nojgaard, we can observe that the
fabulous depiction of animals is controlled by an appeal to common sense: the animals
of fable must simultaneously serve their function as mecaniquement allegoriques and
conform in one way or another to popular expectations of their traits and behaviours.
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Animal Stereotypes and the Impossibility of Change
At this point it is worth reflecting on the theme of character and stereotype as it surfaces
explicitly in a number of collected fables. Babrius’s description of the fox in one of his
longer fables (103 lines!), on the lion, fox, and stag (Babrius 95), incorporates the theme
of knowledge of animal stereotypes into the plot of the story. While the lion is sick and
cannot hunt for himself, he asks his friend the fox to catch a stag with the fox s famous
‘honey-tongued words’ {logoisi thereutheisa sois meliglossois; 95.9)- The fox, who holds
an incomparably privileged position among fable animals, comes across a stag in the
woods and delivers a long speech, beginning with the following lines:
‘The lion is my neighbor, as you know’, said he. ‘But now hes very ill and close to
death, and so he has been thinking much of late concerning who should rule the
beasts when he is gone. ‘The boar,’ he says, ‘is a senseless creature, the bear too slug
gish, the leopard too prone to anger, the tiger a braggart who always keeps to himself.’
The stag, he reckons, is worthiest of all to rule. ‘He has a proud appearance; he lives
many years; his horns are fearful to all creeping things and are like the trees with their
branches, not such as are the horns of bulls.’ Why need I say more?’
(95.13-23, tr. Perry)
The fox uses knowledge of animal stereotypes in this speech to persuade the stag of
his suitability to rule over the beasts; in so doing, the fox also appeals to the stag’s vanity,
itself that creature’s stereotypical trait. Moreover, the punchline of the fable will eventu
ally turn on the reader’s ability to discern the difference between the fox s manipulation
of the image of the stag and the other common association of stags and deer with stupid
ity. While hungrily observing the lion devour the stag, the fox snatches away the stag’s
heart and eats it without the lion’s awareness; when the lion asks what happened to the
heart (kardie), which is by convention the seat of intelligence—the fox simply explains
what everyone knows: the stag has no heart (95.101). Thus knowledge of the stereotypi
cal traits of fable animals becomes a theme of the fable, not only because it is an impor
tant dimension of the fox’s cleverness, but also since both the fox and the reader occupy
privileged positions as masters of the Aesopic zoo.
In fact, the fable tradition frequently expresses the view that everyone—human and
animal—has an essential, unchangeable nature, and that it is dangerous to attempt to
transcend the limitations of one’s character or to try to improve one’s natural circum
stances. This view is expressed particularly clearly in the inter-species fable of the weasel
bride (Barbius 32):
Once a weasel fell in love with a handsome young man, and Cypris, the mother
of Desire, revered goddess, gave her the privilege of changing her form {morphen
ameipsai) and of becoming a woman, one so beautiful that any man would yearn
to possess her. When the young man of her choice saw her he, too, was overcome
by desire and planned to marry her. When the main part of the dinner was over
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a mouse ran by. Up sprang the bride from her richly strewn couch and began to
chase it. That was the end of the wedding banquet. Love (Eros), after playing his
game with skill and merriment, departed. Nature was too much for him {tephusei
garettethe).
The weasels failure to change her natural instincts in accordance with her improved
appearance {morphen ameipsai) is also figured as Love’s inability to overcome nature
iphusis), as if to emphasize nature’s supreme power. A rivalry between nature (phusis)
and divinity surfaces again in the epimythium to a related fable (Perry 107) about Zeus’s
promotion of the fox to the position of king of animals: the fox is made king on the basis
of his intelligence and cunning {to suneton tonphrenon kai topoikilon)—the most prom
inent dimensions of his character—but Zeus also wants to test whether the changed fox
is still marked by another of its characteristics, his cupidity {ten glischroteta). When the
fox is unable to resist chasing a beetle (sent by Zeus) that flies past the royal litter, he is
described as jumping at it in an undignified way {akosmos) and is subsequently demoted
to his old station {eis ten archaian taxin). Thus there is a consistent trope that insists that
character cannot be changed (even by divine intervention) and that nature has set strict
limits on behaviour as well as social mobility. Many fables suggest that there are danger
ous consequences when one tries to transgress the natural boundaries of one’s character
and circumstances by mimicking or appropriating other behaviours (e.g., in Perry 83,
91,97,125,187-8,203,233).
Finally, it should be noted that the animals of fable books frequently act out of char
acter, often with unexpected results. In Perry 146, the brave lion is startled by a mouse,
in Perry 150 he requires the help of one, and in Perry 157 the crafty wolf is unable to trick
the (usually) gullible goat. Successful change is explicitly celebrated in Phaedrus App. 31,
when the wasp—a mule in a former life—tells the butterfly, ‘Look not to what we once
were, but to what we are now’ {non quifuerimus, sed qui nunc simus, vide).

Animal Fable

and

Natural History

The fable tradition occasionally eschews symbolism and anthropomorphism entirely,
revealing a deep and abiding interest in animal behaviour and in material that could
be described as natural history. On the one hand, there are numerous aetiologies offer
ing explanations of particular animal traits and characteristics (e.g.. Perry 25, 65, 82,
152,218); some of these are turned into lessons in keeping with other fabulous warnings
against changing one’s nature, such as the camel whose cropped ears are the result of
a misguided request for horns (Perry 117). Indeed, some of the earliest fables ascribed
to Aesop are aetiological (Aristophanes, Birds 471-5; Plato, Phaedo 6obff.; Callimachus,
Iamb 2). On the other hand, several fables simply describe a particular animal behaviour
(rather than positing any explanation), which is in turn moralized in one way or another
in an epimythium. Occasionally such fables report behaviours found also in science
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writers. For example, Aristotle’s Parts of Animals 4.2 corroborates the camel’s lack of a
gall bladder (cf. Perry 220), and Parts ofAnimals 551a alludes to the idea that after death
a spirit or psyche may take shape as a butterfly (cf. Phaedrus, App. 31). Some of these
expand a single behaviour into a kind of story, such as the fable of the beaver who cas
trates himself to preserve his life (Phaedrus, App. 31) and the halcyon who builds its nest
too close to the sea (Perry 25). In these stories the word legetai (‘it is said) appears in
place of a more traditional incipit {e.g.,pote, ‘Once upon a time’), which marks a differ
ence between anecdotal accounts of animal behaviour and legendary tales of fantastic
animals.

Fable and Science in Dialogue
In August 2009, two animal behaviourists published results of a study showing that
crows were capable of deliberately using stones to raise the water level of a jug. The sci
entists framed the abstract of their article with references to an ancient fable;
In Aesop’s fable ‘The Crow and the Pitcher’, a thirsty crow uses stones to raise the level of
water in a pitcher and quench its thirst. A number of corvids have been found to use tools
in the wild... and New Caledonian crows appear to understand the functional prop
erties of tools and solve complex physical problems via causal and analogical reason
ing. .. We presented four captive rooks with a problem analogous to Aesop’s fable; raising
the level of water so that a floating worm moved into reach. All four subjects solved the
problem with an appreciation of precisely how many stones were needed.
(Bird and Emery, 2009; 1410)
The authors do not claim that Aesop’s fables may be a source of valid and demon
strable scientific truths in other instances; but their casual framing of this experiment
as ‘Aesopic’ in fact participates in a very old dialogue between fable and science. As
Geoffrey Lloyd has demonstrated, some of Aristotle’s beliefs and assumptions in his
approach to animal categorization (e.g., in History ofAnimals and Parts ofAnimals) have
their roots in ‘folklore’, especially animal fable (Lloyd, 1983; 20). The dialogue between
folklore and science has left traces in a wide range of areas, including animal names
that have their roots in descriptive kenning and the Aristotelian notion that animals
can be differentiated from one another on the basis of their particular character {ethos).
A closer look at the history of this crow fable in particular can shed light on the surpris
ingly fluid boundaries between fable and natural science.
To begin with, there is nothing incorrect about calling this story one of ‘Aesop’s
Fables’. The fable is included as number 293 in the fable book of Roger L’Estrange (1693),
perhaps the most influential anglophone Aesop ever produced (Patterson, 1991; Lewis,
1996). But it is not ascribed to Aesop in any direct way before late antiquity, as it is found
in neither the Collectio Augustana nor the verse collections of Phaedrus and Babrius. By
the time the crow fable does appear in Greek and Latin sources in the Hermeneumata
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of pseudo-Dositheus, in a prose paraphrase of Babrius, and in Avianus—closely related
anecdotes seem already to have circulated (in one form or another) rather widely
in other genres (cf. Plutarch, Moralia 967 A; Pliny, Natural History 10.125; Aelian,
Characteristics ofAnimals 2.48). The subtle but significant differences between the ver
sions of‘The Crow and the Pitcher’ as told by the natural scientist Aelian {Characteristics
ofAnimals 2.48) and the verse fabulist Avianus (27) reveal the ways in which their diver
gent narrative techniques and emphases do more to set the two genres apart than any
profound differences in orientation towards the animal world:
A thirsty crow (sitiens cornix) noticed a huge jar and saw that at the very bottom
there was a little bit of water. For a long time the crow tried to spill the water out so
that it would run over the ground and allow her to satisfy her tremendous thirst.
After exerting herself for some time in vain, the crow grew frustrated and applied
all her cunning with unexpected ingenuity: as she tossed little stones into the jar, the
water rose of its own accord until she was able to take a drink. Thisfable shows us that
thoughtfulness is superior to brute strength, since this is the way that the crow was able
to carry her task to its conclusion.
(Avianus 27, tr. Gibbs)

The crows {korakes) of Libya, when (hotan) thirsty men draw water, fill their ves
sels, and place them on the roof in order that the fresh air may keep the water from
spoiling, these crows, I say, help themselves to drink by bending over and inserting
their beaks into the vessels as far as they will go. And when (hotan) the water is too
low they gather pebbles in their mouths and claws and drop them into the earthen
ware vessel. The pebbles are borne down by their weight and sink, while the water,
because of their pressure, rises. So the crows manage to drink by a most ingenious
contrivance (eumechanbs): they understand by some mysterious instinct (phusei tini
aporreto) that one space will not contain two bodies.
(Aelian, Characteristics ofAnimals 2.48)
In Avianus, the initial verb (adspexerat) is in a past tense (‘A thirsty crow
noticed... ’); the story remains set in a non-specific but assuredly past time and
emphasizes the drama of one, singular bird (cornix) and its long process (diu) of
experimentation leading up to its discovery. By means of applying all of its cunning
(omnes dolos) and demonstrating its ‘novel ingenuity’ (nova calliditate), the crow
realizes that by tossing little stones into the jar it can raise the water level and access
the water. The unique act of a single clever bird in Avianus can be contrasted with the
more generalized tone of Aelian, whose plural korakes are placed in a specific geo
graphical locale (Libya). In Aelian’s account, the subjunctive verbs of the temporal
clauses introduced by hotan place emphasis on the typicality and repetitive nature
of the crows’ behaviour, stressing the regularity of the crows’ fascinating behaviour.
After telling this tale, Aelian simply moves on to another interesting story about
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crows, whereas the one bird in Avianus who once discovered a brilliant solution to a
problem is presented as something to be emulated, a demonstration of what a folk
lorist would describe as the motif of ‘Wisdom Taught by Necessity’, catalogued as
Jioi in the Thompson Motif-Index of Folk Literature, 1955. It is interesting to note the
way in which both stories conclude with an author’s comment on the birds’ surpris
ing cleverness, but only in Avianus is cleverness linked to a moralizing epitmythium.
It is also worth noting that neither story involves talking animals, but both describe
the birds’ mental capacities in anthropomorphic terms of‘cunning’ {omnes... dolos)
and ‘ingenious contrivance’ (eumechanos).
But the tone of the dialogue between fable and science can become contentious.
Aristotle is occasionally critical of the fable’s attempts at scientific observation. At
Parts of Animals 3.2, he is critical of a fable (cf. Babrius 59 and Perry 100) in which
Momus claims that the bull’s horns ought to have been put on his shoulders to increase
the strength of thrust. Aristotle points out the placement of horns on the bull’s head
give it the widest possible range and that, if they were placed anywhere else, they
would inhibit a full range of motion. In a similar spirit, Aristotle introduces Aesopic
natural history at Meteorologica 2.3, 356bi3-i5 (although no animals are mentioned),
only to mark Aesopica’s difference from his own project. Aristotle seems in both cases
to go out of his way to mark Aesopic fable as a poor imitation of science, in opposition
to the genuine form of inquiry in which he is engaged (cf. Dijk, 1997: 354)- Finally, we
find another disavowal of Aesopic material as foreign to the project of science at Pliny,
Natural History 10.32; ‘A story is told (narratur) about the mournful song of swans
at their death—a false (falso) story as I judge on the strength of a certain number of
experiences {ut arbitror aliquot experimentisY. Here the fictitious and anecdotal fable
{narratur.. .falso) is explicitly opposed to scientific method {aliquot experimentis).

Sociopolitical Animals

in

The

Aesopic Tradition
Finally, we turn to the social status of the genre, particularly the idea that fable was
linked to the lower classes in antiquity and affiliated with slaves. This is one area of
scholarship where reflections on the fable’s links to ancient attitudes towards animals
do occasionally surface. Opinions on these issues, however, are sharply divided, with
some arguing that the Aesopic fable is a genuine form of social criticism expressing the
viewpoint of the oppressed (Crusius, 1913; La Penna, 1962; Meuli, 1954; de Ste Croix,
1981:444-5; Rothwell, 1996), and others insisting that no single, consistent sociopolitical
perspective characterizes the diversity of content and application of the ancient fable (cf.
Jedrkiewicz, 1989: 395-413; Zafiropoulos, 2001; Holzberg, 2002: 16-17). Animals tend
to become relevant to sociopolitical matters when one draws attention to the potential
for parallels between the fable’s granting of a voice to voiceless animals and its putative
empowerment of members of society who are similarly muted.
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The locus classicus for the idea that the fable expresses the point of view of the
oppressed is a passage from the prologue to the third book of Phaedrus s fable collection:
Now, I will explain briefly why the genre of fable
Was invented. The slave, liable to punishment at all times.
Transferred his personal thoughts into fables.
Since he did not dare to say openly what he wished to say.
And eluded censure under the guise ofjoking with made-up stories.
(Phaedrus 3. Prol. 33-7)
Phaedrus, who is identified as a ‘freedman of Augustus’ (Augusti libertus) in the title
of our principal manuscript (Currie, 1984; cf Champlin, 2005 on historical issues), does
not explicitly link the idea that fable was invented as a kind of secretive slave language to
the way in which the fictional world of fable grants a voice to normally voiceless animals.
Nonetheless, a number of recent studies have shown Phaedrus’s animal fables to be a
valuable repository of ideas relating to the experience and outlook of slaves and freedmen in Rome (cf Bloomer, 1997; Henderson, 2001).
But the reader who approaches the fictionalized animals of Phaedrus’s fables as if they
were speakers of the unspeakable ‘personal thoughts’ {effectus proprios) of Roman slaves
faces a number of significant challenges. The fables themselves do not offer anything
resembling a condemnation of slavery nor even consistent praise of freedom. In fact,
one Phaedrian fable—which seems a deliberate echo of the above quotation—tells of a
runaway slave (servus profugiens, Phaedrus, App. 20.1) who encounters Aesop {Aesopo
occurit; 2) and decides to entrust his personal complaints to the fabulist {tuto querela
quia apud te deponitur, 5). After listening to the long, pitiable list of indignities from
which the slave is attempting to flee, Aesop persuades the runaway slave to give up his
plans of escape with the following words: ‘If you must endure such troubles even with
out having done anything wrong, just think what is going to happen to you now that
you are actually guilty of something!’ (17-19). In fact, numerous examples could be put
forward in defence of the claim that Phaedrus’s fables advocate complaisance and warn
against rebellion. But rather than searching through the explicit messages of the individ
ual fables for evidence of Phaedrus’s personal point of view on issues of slavery and free
dom, the most stimulating recent studies have drawn attention to the ways in which the
topic of slavery in Phaedrian fables relates to the development of the fabulist’s complex
poetic persona (Champlin, 2005) and his interest in anxieties relating to social position
in Imperial Rome (Bloomer, 1997; Henderson, 2001).
The Life ofAesop also stages the emergence of fable from the world of slavery. In addi
tion to being a valuable source on ancient slavery in its own right (Hopkins, 1993), the Life
ofAesop also emphasizes a number of thematic connections between Aesop’s status as a
slave and the animal fables for which he became famous. For example, the text begins by
describing Aesop as both hideously ugly and mute, both of which suggest connections to
the animal world (cf Marin, 1989; Lissarague, 2000). These suggestions are made more
explicit when Aesop is granted the power of speech by the goddess Isis {Life of Aesop,
ch. 7); some characters in the Life ofAesop hear Aesop speak and question whether he is
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indeed human (e.g., Life ofAesop, chs. 14,26), and throughout the text Aesop is compared
to a number of animals: a baboon {kunokephalon; Life ofAesop, chs. 11,30), a mule (ktenos;
Life ofAesop, chs. 18-19), a frog {batrachos; Life ofAesop, ch. 87), a hedgehog (hus trochazon; Life ofAesop, ch. 87), and a monkey {pithekon; Life ofAesop, ch. 87). Aesop’s beastly
appearance is also characterized as a ‘portent’ {semeion), a ‘monstrosity’ (teras), and a
‘riddle’ {ainigma), which is itself in need of interpretation {Life ofAesop, ch. 87), prompt
ing the reader to view his body as similar to the genre of animal fable (Lefkowitz, 2008).
In the climactic episode of the Life ofAesop {Life ofAesop, chs. 124-42) the fabulist is put
to death in Delphi. Scholars have detected traces of ancient pharmakos ritual in the Delphi
passages (Wiechers, 1961; Nagy, 1979) as well as numerous echoes of Socrates’ execution
by the Athenians (Shauer and Merkle, 1992). The juxtaposition of the trickster-slave fabu
list and the elite cult site, and the corrupt way in which the lowly Aesop is framed and
killed—and thus silenced—by the powerful Delphians, serve as the archetypal example
of how Aesopica can draw attention to central ideological tensions within the cultures of
the Classical world (Winkler, 1985; Kurke, 2010). While Aesop’s use of mocking animal
fables against the Delphians has been viewed as a paradigmatic act of fable-telling as soci
opolitical resistance, it is worth noting that it is not just by way of his stories that Aesop
is linked to animals in the vita tradition. In addition to the fables embedded in the narra
tive, animals surface outside of the fables proper, including (in addition to descriptions of
Aesop’s body) Aesop’s naming of animals in his first words {Life ofAesop, ch. 8), his physi
cal proximity to animals {Life ofAesop, ch. 6), his use of animals in the agonistic Xanthus
episodes (e.g.. Life of Aesop, chs. 44-6; 47-8; 51-5; 59; 77-8), and the ways in which his
body {qua slave body) is treated explicitly as if it were less than human throughout the
narrative (cf. especially Life of Aesop, ch. 77), putting the Life of Aesop in dialogue with
ancient discourse on the nebulous boundaries between animals and slaves (on the asso
ciation of slaves with animals, see Bradley, 2000; Fitzgerald, 2000; and Dubois, 2003).

Suggested Reading
The best starting point is Holzberg’s succinct overview (2002), which is judicious, insightful,
and accessible to non-specialists. Dijk (1997) provides a valuable overview of ancient theory
of the fable and a thorough account of the ways in which Greek authors connected fables to
the larger contexts of their works. More complex and tendentious efforts to explain the fable’s
origins and place in cultural history are Adrados (1999), which is dense and difficult, and Kurke
(2010), which breaks new ground in putting Aesopica in direct dialogue with core texts and
ideas of Greek literature—neither study, however, has much interest in animals qua animals.
Essential collections of evidence can be found in Chambry (1925-6), Hausrath (1940-56), and
Perry (1952). For English translations of primary sources, the combination of Perry’s Loeb edi
tion of Babrius and Phaedrus (1965), the collection of Aesop’s fables by Gibbs (2002), and Daly’s
translation of the Life ofAesop (1961; reprinted in Hansen, 1998), will provide a full and accurate
picture of the tradition.
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